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Chairman Neal, Ranking Member Tiberi, Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for 
inviting me to share my views on taxes and the federal budget.  I applaud the 
subcommittee for looking at the role of tax policy in dealing with our long-term budget 
problems. 
 
In summary, I’d like to make three main points: 
 
•  Continuing the current course of enormous and growing deficits is not an option.  
Ignoring budget constraints could produce an economic calamity of 
unprecedented proportions.  And when the budget catastrophe occurs, it will mean 
confiscatory taxes and an eviscerated government—a nightmare scenario 
whatever your political orientation. 
 
•  The budget cannot be tamed by spending cuts or tax increases alone.  The 
retirement of the baby boomers combined with growing healthcare costs will 
require revenue increases if we are not to renege on our promises to seniors.  But 
spending cannot be allowed to grow on its current path without crippling the 
economy.   
 
•  The best way to increase tax revenues is through tax reform—making the tax 
system fairer, simpler, and more conducive to economic growth.  This means base broadening—and subjecting the nearly 200 spending programs that are run 
through the tax code to the same scrutiny applied to direct spending programs. 
 
Avoiding Catastrophic Budget Failure 
 
It has become a cliché to say that current budget trends are unsustainable, and to cite 
Herb Stein’s dictum that if something can’t go on forever, it will stop.  Stein was clearly 
correct, but how our debt stops growing matters.  The best outcome is that it stops 
growing because policymakers make the hard choice of cutting programs and raising 
taxes before the economy has suffered any real damage.   
 
A slightly more painful option is that interest rates start to increase to reflect the 
increasing riskiness of government securities—because higher debt brings with it a risk 
that the US will either default on some of its debt or be forced to print money to avoid a 
default, triggering inflation or even hyperinflation.  Higher interest rates would bring 
increasing political pressure to reduce the deficit from businesses that can’t afford to 
invest and consumers who can’t afford to borrow to buy a home or car.  The downside is 
that the higher interest rates would also increase government’s debt service costs, making 
the required fiscal adjustments even more painful.  And higher interest rates could 
precipitate a recession (or stifle a nascent recovery). 
 
The worst outcome is that interest rates show no perceptible effect from the US 
borrowing binge for a long time.  Rates may stay low because our foreign lenders have an 
incentive to keep enabling our borrowing habit. The money they lend us fuels our giant 
trade deficit, which in turn props up their economies.  If they pulled the plug, the dollar 
would collapse in value and US demand for foreign goods would slow to a trickle.  So, in 
part, our debt habit simply reflects a very dangerous codependency between us and our 
foreign enablers. 
 
We might hope that financial markets would save us from catastrophe by demanding 
higher interest rates on Treasuries, but that would require a degree of foresight that we 
haven’t seen lately.  Despite some saber rattling from bond rating agencies, our lenders 
have clearly calculated that Treasuries are a safe investment at low interest rates because 
as long as we can roll over maturing debt at low rates, we can easily pay the interest our 
lenders demand.   
 
This dynamic is eerily similar to the bubble logic that overtook the housing market.  
Lenders concluded that as long as housing prices were growing at double digit rates, 
almost any borrower was worthy of a mortgage because, under the worst case scenario, 
the lender could foreclose and sell the house at a profit.  Cheap and easy credit boosted 
demand for homes and kept prices soaring, fulfilling the expectations of lenders—for a 
while.  The problem was that prices couldn’t rise forever, and when they stopped, the 
bubble burst. 
 
The analogy in the government bond market is that at some point  investors will decide 
that lending to the US government is risky and demand a higher interest rate.  The higher 
  2rate increases default risk as debt service becomes more burdensome, and the higher risk 
pushes the required interest rate up further.  This vicious cycle pushes interest rates ever 
higher.  When the dust settles, the government may only be able to borrow at exorbitant 
interest rates—or possibly not at all.   
 
That is, the market for government bonds might be a classic bubble.  But when this 
bubble bursts, the government won’t have the option to borrow to prop up financial 
markets if its borrowing caused the crisis. 
 
Unable to borrow, the government will have to cut spending to the bone—including 
potentially devastating cuts in Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid—and have to 
raise taxes to levels never before seen in this country. And even that may not be enough 
for forestall default.  In October 2009, more than $2.5 trillion of debt had a maturity of 
less than one year.  If the government could not roll over that debt, there is no way that it 
could cut spending or raise taxes fast enough to avoid default.  (CBO projected total 
income tax revenues in 2010 to be about $1.1 trillion, so doubling the income  tax—
which is neither feasible nor desirable—would not close even half the gap.)  As the debt 
grows, the amount of debt coming due each year—and the size of the potential crisis—
will grow as well. 
 
Thus, the Federal Reserve would have to serve as the “lender of last resort” for the US 
government, massively expanding the money supply.  If the bubble burst tomorrow, the 
Fed might be able to plausibly commit to tightening the money supply in the near future 
as the federal government ran surpluses to buy back the debt.  If investors believed this, 
we might avoid hyperinflation.  But even in this case, investors might be skeptical of any 
promise of fiscal responsibility from the government that precipitated the crisis.  And if 
the debt were twice as big when the bubble bursts, the government would have no 
credibility at all. 
 
The consequence would likely involve a long and severe recession or depression and 
hyperinflation.  In their survey of financial crises through the ages, Carmen Reinhart and 
Ken Rogoff (2009) reported that the average debt crisis of the sort we’re likely to 
experience came with inflation of 9000 percent.  That is, after the crisis, a dollar might be 
worth a little more than a penny. 
 
Bottom line:  catastrophic budget failure would involve hyperinflation, an eviscerated 
public sector, taxes that would make a Scandinavian revolt, and a crippled economy.  
Avoiding that fate should be your highest priority. 
 
Tax Increases are Inevitable 
 
Nobody likes to pay taxes, but there is no practical way to tame the debt without higher 
taxes unless you are willing to renege on promises made to seniors.  Figure 1 summarizes 
the demographic challenge facing the nation.  There are currently about 4.7 working age 
individuals (ages 20-64) for every person of retirement age (65 and older). But, as the 
baby boomers reach retirement age, that number plummets to 4.0 in 2018 and just 3.0 in 
  32028.  Some refer to the inverse of this ratio as the “dependency ratio”—a measure of 
how many retirees depend on Social Security and Medicare for each person working and 
paying into the system.  Even if health care costs weren’t growing faster than the rest of 
the economy, the swelling dependency ratio would require the dwindling share of 
workers to shoulder larger burdens. 
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Figure 1.  Ratio of Working Age Individuals to Retirees, 1962‐2080
Source:  CongressionalBudget Office, 2009.  
 
The consequence is that either taxes must increase significantly above historic levels to 
prevent enormous accumulations of public debt, or that government services, especially 
those benefiting the elderly, must be cut substantially below current levels.  Figure 2 
shows that even if health care costs grew at the same rate as the economy from 2009 on 
(rather than the historical average of 2.5 percent per year faster than GDP), primary 
spending—excluding interest on the debt—would still escalate rapidly from 20 percent of 
GDP in 2012 because of the demands of aging baby boomers.  By 2030, spending would 
reach 23 percent of GDP.  If revenues were kept at their post-war average level of 18.3 
percent of GDP, deficits, the debt, and interest payments on the debt would soar. 
  4 
In reality, healthcare spending has grown much faster than GDP for decades—by an 
average of 2.5 percentage points.  If it continues to follow that path, spending will 
increase dramatically.   CBO projects that total federal primary spending will exceed 25 
percent of GDP by 2030 and top 27 percent by 2040.
1  Clearly, healthcare spending will 
have to slow or households and governments at all levels will be bankrupted. It is highly 
unlikely, however, that we can hold the rate of growth of health costs below that of the 
economy.  One reason is that a significant share of healthcare spending has paid for 
valuable innovations that have improved the quality and length of life.  Artificial joint 
replacements that preserve pain-free mobility for older people are the classic example.  
Cutler (2005) argues that, given the potential benefits, we are not spending enough on 
healthcare.  Cohen et al (2008) argue that spending on preventive care is far below 
optimum, and Liebman and Zeckhauser (2008) explain why human foibles 
(procrastination and the tendency to undervalue future benefits relative to current costs) 
lead people to consume too little healthcare. 
 
Thus, while it is essential that healthcare costs be restrained over the long term, it may be 
neither feasible nor desirable to shrink healthcare spending as a share of the economy. 
 
                                                 
1 As alarming as these estimates are, they assume that discretionary spending both for defense and non-
defense purposes will decline as a share of GDP.  If that is not true, for example, because of the costs of 
addressing future security threats or maintaining our crumbling infrastructure, spending could be even 
higher.  The estimates also do not include the effects of healthcare legislation currently being considered by 
Congress, which could add to or reduce deficits depending on the ultimate design. 
  5Furthermore, tremendous uncertainty exists about future health technology and spending 
patterns, but past experience is not encouraging.  It is highly likely that health spending 
will compound the long-term budget problem. 
 
It is tempting to wish that we will grow out of the problem, but that is implausible.  Most 
of the factors that have boosted output over the past few decades are unlikely to repeat.  
For example, the tremendous increase in women’s labor force participation was a one-
time event.
2   
 
The greater risk is that swelling national debt will slow economic growth.  Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) calculated that countries with debt above 90 percent of GDP grow by an 
average of 1.3 percentage points per year slower than less debt-ridden countries.  (The 
debt-to-GDP ratio is currently about 60 percent of GDP; CBO projects it will reach 90 
percent around 2020 under current policies.)  If growth slows, all of the economic 
challenges that we face will worsen. 
 
Taxes and Economic Growth 
 
With few exceptions, taxes entail economic costs.
3  Some supply-siders have even 
contended that cuts in marginal tax rates could pay for themselves because the economy 
would grow faster and generate more tax revenues.  Serious analyses of supply-side tax 
cuts, even by those very sympathetic to the premise that tax cuts can boost economic 
growth, have all concluded that deficit-financed tax cuts do not pay for themselves over 
the long run.
4  In fact, if the resulting deficits are ultimately offset by higher tax rates, the 
ultimate effect is likely to be lower GDP. 
 
This occurs because the cost of taxation grows disproportionately with the tax rate.  Thus, 
if top tax rates are cut from 40 percent to 35 percent for a while, but then raised to 45 
percent to pay back the resulting debt, the 5 percentage point increase in rates reduces 
growth by much more than the temporary 5 percentage point rate cut boosted it.   
 
As a general rule, stable tax rates impose less economic cost than volatile ones.  For that 
reason, it would be far better to raise taxes soon to reduce or eliminate the deficit (after 
the economy has recovered from the economic downturn) than to postpone action for 
many years.  The longer we wait, the higher tax rates would have to be to restore balance.  
                                                 
2 For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Minarik (2010). 
3 The exceptions are where taxes mitigate a market failure, such as pollution.   The scope for raising 
revenue from such taxes is not insignificant, but not anywhere near enough to eliminate the long-term fiscal 
gap. 
4 The Congressional Budget Office, Joint Committee on Taxation, and the Treasury all conducted studies in 
the early 2000s.  They concluded that tax rate cuts could boost the economy in the short-run, but not by 
nearly enough to offset the direct revenue loss.  The long-run effect depended on how the deficits were 
closed.  If the deficits ultimately led to higher tax rates, GDP would be lower than without the tax cuts.  If 
the deficits ultimately led to spending cuts, GDP would increase permanently.  In all cases, the effects were 
small.  See Gravelle (2007) for an excellent survey.  
  6And income tax rates of 50 or 60 or 70 percent would entail huge economic costs 
compared with a 40 percent rate.
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Taxing the Rich Won’t be Enough 
 
While supply-siders hold out hope that tax cuts can somehow pay for themselves, liberals 
also cling to their own version of wishful thinking—that tax increases on the rich would 
suffice.   President Obama has repeatedly promised not to raise taxes on households 
earning less than $250,000 per year.  Rosanne Altshuler and colleagues at the Tax Policy 
Center (2010) estimated how much income tax rates would have to increase—assuming 
the rest of the Obama budget were enacted—to get the deficit down to an average of 2 
percent of GDP from 2015 to 2019.  They concluded that rates would have to increase by 
almost half:  the 10-percent bracket would increase to almost 15 percent and the top 
bracket would increase to 52 percent—a level not seen since enactment of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986.   
 
Table 1.  Rates Required to Reduce Deficit to Two 
Percent of GDP from 2015 to 2019 
      
 Current Tax     Raise All     Raise Top     Raise Top  
 Rates     Rates   Three Rates  Two Rates
 10.0     14.9     10.0     10.0   
 15.0     22.3     15.0     15.0   
 25.0     37.2     25.0     25.0   
 28.0     41.7     60.8     28.0   
 33.0     49.1     71.7     85.7   
 35.0     52.1     76.1     90.9   
 
If tax increases are limited to those with higher incomes, the top rates would have to 
become truly exorbitant to hit the 2-percent deficit target.  Raising only the top 3 rates 
would require a top rate of 76 percent; and raising only the top 2 rates—the policy most 
consistent with the President’s promise to spare the middle class—would require a top 
rate of almost 91 percent, a level not seen since the Kennedy Administration. 
 
As Altshuler et al (2010) point out, those estimates do not account for the increased tax 
avoidance that high rates would engender.  Accounting for such behavioral responses 
would require even higher rates. It is thus infeasible that the deficit target could be met 
with tax increases on the rich alone.  And, given that the deficit grows ever larger, the 
target would grow more elusive over time. 
 
                                                 
5 CBO estimates that allowing the Bush tax cuts to expire (raising top income tax rates to 40 percent) would 
reduce the primary deficit (excluding interest) to less than 2 percent of GDP until after 2030.  Over the long 
term, further spending cuts or tax increases would be necessary, but CBO’s calculations show that a top 
rate of about 40 percent could be consistent with a much improved fiscal situation. 
  7Base Broadening and Deficit Reduction 
 
Tax rate increases harm the economy and cannot, by themselves, close the budget gap.  In 
contrast, base broadening can boost tax revenues and make the income tax more efficient, 
fair, and comprehensible.
6  Loopholes and preferences in the income tax complicate tax 
preparation and create opportunities for tax avoidance and evasion.  For example, long-
term capital gains face a 15-percent top rate compared with a 35 percent rate for ordinary 
income.  The capital gains preference has created a whole tax shelter industry designed to 
convert highly taxed ordinary income into lightly taxed capital gains.  The lower rate can 
distort investment and occupation choices.  For example, finance experts who work in the 
private equity arena are taxed at less than half the rate of bond traders who may work 
down the hall and do very similar work.  Taxing capital gains at the same rate as other 
income would eliminate those distortions.
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The numerous tax preferences in the Code and reduce tax revenues by an enormous 
amount—over $1 trillion a year.
8  Like healthcare expenditures, they are growing faster 
than the rest of the economy.  Over the next 5 years, so-called “tax expenditures” will 
reduce federal revenues by over $9 trillion, or 74 percent of income tax revenues.  
Subjecting tax expenditures to the same level of scrutiny we apply to direct spending 
programs could improve the efficiency of the government and help tame the budget 
deficit.  And, arguably, since tax expenditures are really just spending programs in 
disguise, limiting tax expenditures could be seen as consistent with the President’s 
promise to spare the middle class from tax increases.  Indeed, the President has proposed 
to limit cap the growth of discretionary spending.  It would make sense to apply the same 
budget discipline to the far larger category of spending programs run through the tax 
system. 
 
The concept of tax expenditures is controversial, but it has been around for decades, since 
Treasury Assistant Secretary Stanley Surrey proposed that deviations from the normal tax 
rules that serve to benefit a particular group or activity should be considered spending.  
The basic notion is that a $100 tax reduction for undertaking a particular activity is 
identical to a $100 cash grant for the subsidized activity in terms of its effect on the 
deficit and resource allocation. 
 
Conservatives have objected to the notion of a tax expenditure since long before Surrey 
coined the term.  William Gladstone, a Tory member of the British parliament, argued in 
                                                 
6 Saez et al (2009) conclude that rate increases entail significant economic costs while base broadening 
reduces the cost of taxation.  Conservative icon Martin Feldstein (2009) made the same argument in a Wall 
Street Journal op ed, arguing that additional revenues are needed and eliminating tax breaks would be far 
better than raising tax rates. 
7 Numerous other arguments are made for a lower tax rate on capital gains.  See Burman (1999) for a 
discussion and critique. 
8 The estimates in this paragraph are based on the sum of the tax expenditure estimates reported in the 
Analytical Perspectives volume of the federal budget.  Adding tax expenditures ignores potentially 
significant interactions among the different tax subsidies.  Burman et al (2008) found that including 
interactions would increase the total by 5 to 8 percent.  Thus, the $1.1 trillion sum of tax expenditures in 
2010 is likely an underestimate of the total cost. 
  81863 that the government should monitor the uses of the charitable deduction allowed 
under the income tax, just as it would any other spending program. The rebuttal from Sir 
Strafford Northcote could be lifted from the modern ultraconservative’s critique of tax 
expenditures: “The right hon. Gentleman, if he took £5 out of the pocket of a man with 
£100, put the case as if he gave the man £95…” (Quoted by Neil Brooks, 1986) 
 
For some reason, modern conservatives find this talking point compelling, but I have a 
hard time understanding why.  Virtually any spending program could be converted into a 
tax expenditure.  Why does that sleight of hand inoculate a spending program from 
scrutiny?  The late Princeton economist David Bradford—one of the intellectual 
forebears of the “flat tax”—used to quip that he could fund the Pentagon with tax 
expenditures (by, for example, providing refundable tax credits in lieu of cash to arms 
manufacturers), reducing the size of the recorded defense budget without hurting national 
security one bit.   
 
To take another example, suppose we offered individuals eligible for Medicare the option 
of buying their insurance for an actuarially fair premium from the government, in 
exchange for a tax credit equal to 110% of the premium.  Higher-income seniors with 
sufficient tax liability to use the credit would presumably take advantage of this great 
deal.  It would cut Medicare spending, and cut taxes by even more.  Government would 
appear to be smaller and taxes lower, but in reality, we’d only have complicated tax 
compliance for seniors and increased the deficit. 
 
The growth of tax expenditures has been fueled by a political environment that favors 
“tax cuts” over spending, even when a spending program might be more effective.  But 
tax expenditures strongly resemble entitlement programs and can be just as detrimental to 
the budget over the long term.  And they often make the tax system more complex. 
 
Monitoring tax expenditures would require a significant change in the budgeting process 
as most tax subsidies are now virtual entitlements, continuing (and growing) unless 
Congress legislates change or repeal.  Former JCT chief of staff George Yin (2009) has 
proposed sunsetting all tax expenditures and requiring periodic reauthorization as for 
discretionary programs.  A less radical approach would be to include the value of tax 
expenditures with direct expenditures and subject the totals to caps as part of the 
Congressional budget process.  This obviously would create some jurisdictional 
challenges for Congress (between appropriating committees and the tax-writing 
committees), but it is, in my view, the only way to get total spending under control.  It 
makes no sense to exempt more than $1 trillion of spending from budget scrutiny. 
I'm certainly not proposing to eliminate all tax expenditures. It makes sense to run some 
programs through the tax system instead of setting up another bureaucracy. I just think 
we ought to subject these expenditures to the same fiscal constraint and scrutiny that the 
President wants to apply to other domestic spending programs.  
 
  9Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Taming the budget will require both spending cuts and new tax revenues.  The best way 
to raise revenues would be to broaden the base—eliminate or reform tax expenditures 
that are not serving their purpose with the goal of making the tax system simpler, fairer 
and more conducive to economic growth.  As part of that process, other more efficient 
sources of revenue such as a VAT should be considered. 
 
The President has signaled that his deficit reduction panel may consider tax reform as 
part of a package of revenue increases and spending cuts.  That’s a good idea.  However, 
if Congress makes most of the Bush and Obama tax cuts permanent, as the President 
proposes, tax reform would become much more difficult.  A better approach would be to 
extend the tax cuts for two or three years and commit to a real process of tax and 
expenditure reforms to eliminate the primary deficit by a certain date. 
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